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Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell are talented and distinguished legal
academics who for the past several years have been working jointly on a
massive project in normative law and economics. The project's goal is to
answer the question: What are the criteria by which legal policies (rules,
standards, decisions, and other authoritative acts) ought to be assessed and
proposals calling for their reform to be evaluated? In answering this
question, they consider two normative frameworks--one defined by a
concern for the impact of policies on human welfare, the other defined by a
concern for various principles of fairness. Thus, the title of the book:
Fairness Versus Welfare.' There is no surprise ending, as from the outset
Kaplow and Shavell are clear that they judge welfare the unambiguous
winner of the competition.
Previous iterations of the book have been in circulation for some time
and available on the Internet.2 In addition, Kaplow and Shavell have made
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the rounds of law and economics workshops for several years,3 taking the
opportunity such occasions provide to set out and defend the book's central
claims. Beyond that, the book has been the subject of numerous
conferences and panels at professional meetings. It is unlikely, therefore,
that many intended readers are not already familiar with its claims and the
arguments marshaled on their behalf.
Even so, it is useful to distinguish among three groups of potential
readers. The first two groups are the representatives of protagonists. On the
one side are the deontologists-philosophers and legal theorists committed
to the idea that some or other deontic considerations must play an
independent role in assessing legal practice as well as calls for its reform.
Along with everyone from Plato and Aristotle to Kant, Rawls, and
Dworkin, Kaplow and Shavell are kind enough explicitly to include me in
this group. This group is their target. As Kaplow and Shavell see it, no
argument they could muster might convince the deontologists of the error
of their ways, so hopelessly are the deontologists in the grip of a mistaken
view. On the other side stand the fellow travelers along the law-and-
economics highway. This group represents Kaplow and Shavell's natural
allies. Although the argument of the book might firm their resolve, and
harden them in battles with the deontologists, it is not necessary to persuade
them. The argument of the book will be lost on the first group and otiose for
the second. This leaves the uncommitted law professor searching for an
analytical and normative framework within which to organize her thinking
and through which to sharpen her critical lens. The book is self-consciously
aimed at capturing the hearts and minds of this segment of the legal
academy.4
It should come as something of a surprise, then, that among the most
vehement critics of Kaplow and Shavell's project are other advocates of an
economic approach to the law.5 Whereas most deontologists are likely
merely to dismiss Kaplow and Shavell as unsophisticated and their
arguments as inadequately nuanced, the majority of law-and-economics
scholars are anxious to dissociate themselves from a thesis they are
convinced is dangerous to the cause. Why? The answer is that the book
openly endorses precisely the imperialistic claims with which others have
saddled the law-and-economics movement, often in an effort to discredit it
3. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, at xxi-xxii (listing workshops at which the authors
have presented portions of the book).
4. See id. at 79-81, 389-94.
5. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the
Pareto Principle, I 10 YALE L.J. 173 (2000); Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian,
110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000).
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as inadequately catholic or, in the extreme, uncivilized.6 Whereas the vast
majority of law-and-economics scholars have been trying to make the case
for including efficiency among the factors suitable to assessing legal reform
proposals, the entire point of the Kaplow and Shavell argument is that the
only considerations that can figure in a rational reform policy are those of
human welfare-or efficiency properly construed.
One might suppose that any book that triggers so much fear and
loathing-that sends its natural allies scampering for shelter and engenders
apoplexy among its targets-has to be either really dreadful or of
fundamental importance. Fairness Versus Welfare is neither. The book is
divided into two parts of very unequal length. In the first part, the authors
distinguish the two competing normative frameworks of fairness and
welfare from one another and set forth the general framework by which
they shall adjudicate between the two. 7 In the second, and by far the longer,
section of the book, they set out to make good on the strategy of evaluation
by comparing fairness and welfare in a wide range of areas of the law-
both private and public.8 The argument of the book requires for its success
treating the two parts of the book as connected. That is because the
objection to fairness is that the price of fairness is too high in terms of its
likely impact on welfare, and so it is the burden of the second part to
establish just how extensive those detrimental effects are likely to be.9 In
this sense, the second part forms the evidentiary base for the thesis of the
first part.
In fact, however, the second part of the book can stand on its own and
constitutes a significant contribution to discussions of the impact on human
welfare of various regimes of rules, standards, and policies in a wide range
of areas of the law. The source of consternation for "friend" and foe alike is
the first part of the book. Whereas the second part is nearly invaluable to
anyone interested in policy analysis and legal reform, the first part's
argument is entirely unsuccessful. Unfortunately, the overall argument of
the book depends crucially on it.
Fairness Versus Welfare claims that welfare, and not fairness, is the
standard appropriate to assessing the law and calls for its reform. This is a
normative claim and, as such, requires normative argument on its behalf.
Any suitable argument for the authors' claim then will consist in a set of
6. Cf Joseph William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 103, 124-30 (2002) (accusing Kaplow and Shavell of imperialistically insisting upon an
overly cramped conception of the human good).
7. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 3-81. The book concludes with a few chapters that
elaborate upon the framework presented in the fi-st part of the book. For purposes of my bipartite
division, these chapters can be treated as addenda to the first part.
8. Id. at 85-378.
9. See id. at 58 (noting that later chapters will document the extent to which fairness-based
policies and rules diminish human welfare).
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reasons or grounds for the claim that welfare, and not fairness, is the
appropriate basis for assessing law and its reform. The burden of providing
an account of what is to count as grounds or reasons for that claim is the
task of the first part of the book: the evaluative framework. Sadly, instead
of discharging that obligation, Fairness Versus Welfare serves up empty
tautological claims and underdeveloped putative causal explanations-
explanations, moreover, that were they in fact adequate, would be so strong
as to undermine, rather than support, the book's overall thesis. Fairness
Versus Welfare makes a bold normative claim, but it offers no argument
adequate to support it.
In Part I of this Review, I summarize the debate on the normative
foundation of efficiency prior to the publication of the Kaplow and Shavell
book. In Part II, I criticize Kaplow and Shavell's argument that welfare is
the uniquely appropriate standard for the assessment of the law and
proposals for its reform. In Part III of this Review, I sketch an alternative
account of the value of welfare. On that view, however, whatever it is about
welfare that explains its value and aptness for assessing the law also
explains why fairness is valuable and appropriate to assessing the law. In
short, Kaplow and Shavell's account of welfare fails to explain its value
and its role in evaluating the law. On the other hand, any plausible account
of welfare that is capable of explaining its value explains as well the value
of fairness and its appropriateness to evaluating the law and proposals for
its reform. The central claim of the book is not just inadequately defended,
but, at the end of the day, unsupportable.
I. WHY EFFICIENCY? THE DEBATE PRIOR TO FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
Law and economics has attained such a dominant position within the
modem legal academy that we can be excused for forgetting how relatively
young a field it is. Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law'0 is the
work most responsible for thrusting an economic approach to law onto the
broader academic landscape. The distinctive feature of that book was the
claims it made on behalf of the explanatory prowess of economic
efficiency. In the face of the familiar Critical Legal Studies objection that
the law lacks coherence and objective, rational content," proponents of the
economic analysis of law, led by Posner, argued that the law is a rational,
coherent, and relatively determinate body of standards, the coherence and
determinate content of which are explained by the principle of efficiency.
As Posner and those who followed him argued, vast areas of the law-
10. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). The book is currently in its
sixth edition.
11. E.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L. 1 (1984).
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especially the private law-could be rationally reconstructed as if they were
designed to produce an efficient allocation of resources.' 2 The claim was
not that the law should promote efficiency-only that it did.
This desire to shy away from efficiency as a normative ideal could not
be sustained, however. For law is the sort of institution that claims a
legitimate authority for itself.'3 By its nature, law is coercive. Coercion is,
by definition, an interference with human autonomy and personal
prerogatives. To the extent that personal autonomy and human prerogatives
are presumptively good, coercion is presumptively bad. It requires a
defense. Law claims just such justification for itself. The claim may turn
out to be false-sometimes or often. Still, the claim is not incoherent or
necessarily false. This means that law must be the sort of thing of which the
claim could be true. Those who claim that the law is efficient also claim
that this fact about it contributes to its legitimacy. If that is so, it is natural
to ask what principles of justified political or legal authority efficiency
embodies or expresses. Posner understood the importance and
appropriateness of this line of inquiry and saw it as his burden to answer the
question: What justifies efficiency?
The burden of economic analysis is to identify a political or moral
value beyond efficiency itself that would be adequate to justify the state's
employing its coercive machinery in order to achieve it. How could the best
interpretation of legal practice identify it as efficient if there were nothing
to be said from the moral point of view on behalf of efficiency? Law's
efficiency might merely undermine, rather than support, its claim to
legitimacy. Nor would it be enough to associate some or other moral value
with efficiency. After all, not everything of value is justly pursued through
the law. The problem is not merely to identify some or other moral value
achieved by efficiency, but to find one that would justify promoting
efficiency through the coercive machinery of the law.
In setting out to meet this challenge, one might have expected Posner to
avail himself of the strategy of identifying economic analysis with classical
forms of utilitarianism. In promoting efficiency, the law promotes utility.
To the extent it is appropriate for law to promote utility, it is similarly
appropriate for it to seek to achieve an efficient allocation of resources.
Since Bentham at least, the claim that the law appropriately pursues utility
has an illustrious pedigree. The alliance between efficiency and utility
would have seemed natural in part because law and economics relies on the
Pareto criteria of efficiency. The Pareto criteria are themselves understood
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
12. POSNER, supra note 10, at 98-100.
13. This claim is often associated with Raz. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 29-30
(1979).
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in terms of the role they have played in solving problems within utilitarian
moral and political theory.
We can distinguish between Pareto optimality and Pareto superiority.
We begin by defining Pareto superiority and then define Pareto optimality
in terms of it. A state of affairs S is Pareto superior to another, A, if and
only if no one prefers A to S and at least one person prefers S to A. The
notion of Pareto optimality is then defined with respect to Pareto
superiority. A state of affairs S is Pareto optimal provided there is no state
of affairs S, that is Pareto superior to it.
The Pareto rankings were introduced into the utilitarian literature in the
early part of the last century in order to solve the so-called interpersonal
comparability problem. They allow one to compare social states without
making interpersonal comparisons of utility. If S is Pareto superior to A,
then because at least one person's welfare or utility is improved and no
one's is reduced, a move from A to S increases overall utility. There is no
need to make any interpersonal utility comparisons, as there would be if a
move from A to S created both winners and losers. Thus, social scientists
generally (Pareto himself was a sociologist, not an economist) took the
Pareto rankings as a way of rendering claims about overall utility verifiable
and thus meaningful. 14 Given its role within both economic analysis and
utilitarian moral theory, it is only natural to think, therefore, that the
foundation for the economic approach to law is utilitarianism as mediated
by Paretianism. The political or moral value captured by efficiency is
utility, and economic analysis is pan of the grand utilitarian tradition
tracing itself back to Sidgwick and Bentham and beyond.
Natural as the alliance would appear, Posner would have none of it, and
for the simple reason that he had been convinced by the classic objections
to utilitarianism. 5 Maximizing utility can often lead to injustice, sacrificing
the one for the good of the many. Utilitarianism is a defective moral theory,
an inappropriate standard on which to justify state coercion---or so Posner
himself thought. If efficiency is, as he thought it was, an appropriate
standard of state action, then one would have to look elsewhere to explain
its normative attractiveness. To find a moral foundation suitable to
efficiency, Posner looked to a particular conception of Kantian moral
theory-one that emphasized the importance of individual autonomy as
expressed in the capacity to consent.
14. It is worth pointing out that the so-called "interpersonal comparison" problem arose
during the heyday of logical positivism, and that the problem may well be no more than an artifact
of a mistaken semantic and metaphysical thesis, and not a real problem at all. At least, that is my
view.
15. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103, 111-19 (1979).
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The argument he devised went as follows. 6 States of affairs that are
Pareto superior make no one worse off and at least one person better off.
For that reason no one could object to them. In other words, everyone
would agree or consent to them. States of affairs that are Pareto optimal
have no states Pareto superior to them. Any movement from a Pareto
optimal state will make someone worse off, and so not everyone will
consent to it. People will consent to Pareto superior states and will never
unanimously consent to departures from Pareto optimal states. Thus, the
Pareto rankings reflect a commitment to consent and autonomy, not to
utility. We need to distinguish the history of the Pareto rankings from the
principles of morality to which they actually give expression. The history is
utilitarian; the justification is Kantian. Or so Posner argued.
Welcome though it was, Posner's argument generated a bevy of critical
responses, including mine. In the first place, very little efficiency analysis
in the law actually invokes the Pareto criteria. Most efficiency analysis
relies instead on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.' 7 One state of affairs, S, is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient to another, A, if and only if the winners under S
could compensate the losers such that, after compensation, no one would
prefer A to S and at least one person would prefer S to A. For this reason,
some advocates of law and economics, like Guido Calabresi, came to refer
to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as the "potential Pareto" principle.' 8 States of
affairs are Kaldor-Hicks efficient to others if and only if they could (were
compensation actually paid) be Pareto superior. Of course, compensation is
not paid, and so they are not in fact Pareto superior. That they are
potentially Pareto superior has as much bearing on how they should be
treated as the fact that I am potentially President of the United States has on
how I should be treated now. The fact is that unlike the Pareto criteria,
Kaldor-Hicks allows for both winners and losers. If the worries about
interpersonal comparability are legitimate, Kaldor-Hicks reintroduces them;
it does not solve them.
Those concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion is subject to the Scitovsky Paradox. Scitovsky showed that two
states of affairs can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient to one another.' 9 This means
that Kaldor-Hicks is not even a weakly transitive ordering relationship.
16. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487,488-97 (1980).
17. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the
Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221, 237-47 (1980); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 525 (1980) [hereinafier Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization].
18. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 85-86 (1978).
19. See T. de Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD.
77 (1941); see also Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, supra note 17, at 519
n. 14 (providing a brief demonstration of the paradox).
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Because Kaldor-Hicks does not observe transitivity, one cannot infer from
the fact that S is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to A that S has more utility than A.
But if Kaldor-Hicks cannot be defended on the grounds that it embodies
utility, it certainly cannot be defended on Kantian grounds. For there are
losers under Kaldor-Hicks efficient states of affairs, and one cannot infer
their consent to being made a loser.2° My first set of objections to Posner's
argument, then, had three elements. First, efficiency analysis in the law
invokes Kaldor-Hicks and not Pareto. Second, because Kaldor-Hicks is
intransitive, it cannot reliably track utility and cannot be defended on
utilitarian grounds. Third, if we assume that losers do not consent to their
losses, Kaldor-Hicks cannot be defended on Posner's conception of Kantian
grounds either.
It would be a mistake to think that these problems are reserved only for
Kaldor-Hicks, for even were economic analysis restricted to the Pareto
criteria, there is no Kantian, autonomy, or consent argument in the offing.
Consider first the criterion of Pareto optimality. A Pareto optimal state is
one that has no states Pareto superior to it. Any movement from a Pareto
optimal state will produce losers. So it may be reasonable to assume that
movementfrom a Pareto optimal state would not be unanimously agreed to.
But it does not mean that movement to a Pareto optimal state from a prior
state would be consented to, nor does it mean that everyone would consent
to the Pareto optimal state in which they find themselves. A Pareto optimal
state can itself be the result of a Pareto noncomparable change, one that
produces winners as well as losers. If we presume that the losers in going to
a Pareto optimal state would not consent to the move, then the move to a
Pareto optimal state would not have been consented to.
A simple example illustrates the general point. At time t, everyone has
nine units of X each except Jones, who has one unit of X. At 1+1, Jones has
one hundred units of X and everyone else has only one unit of X each. Any
20. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, supra note 17, at 533-39. On the
other hand, if we ask whether individuals would choose to have policy made according to Kaldor-
Hicks, then the answer might be "Yes" under well-defined circumstances, but these are the same
conditions that Harsanyi showed would lead individuals to adopt average utilitarianism with
interpersonal utility comparisons. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics
and the Theory of Risk-Bearing, 61 J. POL. EcoN. 434 (1953). In that case, efficiency analysis is
just a (perhaps) mathematically more sophisticated way of representing a commitment to average
utilitarianism. But the defense of utilitarianism or efficiency (understood as Kaldor-Hicks) is not
in terms of any particular moral value. Rather, it is simply a logical consequence of the notion of
rationality defined in a particular way. Average utility falls out of our notion of rational choice
and risk neutrality. Rational, risk-neutral parties will prefer or choose (the same thing on this
theory, since to prefer is to be disposed to choose under appropriate circumstances) a principle of
average utility as a way of distributing resources among themselves. This is what Harsanyi
proves, and as David Gauthier once remarked, one does not argue against theorems. What one
does is show that this is not a defense of the moral attractiveness of utilitarianism, but a
consequence of a certain conception of rationality (in conjunction with the formulation of a
particular choice problem). One would then have to show what moral value, if any, is embodied in
this particular conception of rationality, and so on.
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move from t+l will make Jones worse off and thus the allocation at t+l is
Pareto optimal. By the same token, the move to the situation at t+1 would
not have been consented to by anyone other than Jones. That does not mean
that t+1 is not Pareto optimal. It is. It's just that the Pareto optimality of the
world at t+l tells us nothing about whether or not it is or would be
consented to.
If we move on to consider Pareto superiority, we locate the real
problem with Posner's defense of efficiency. Posner's thought is that
because no one is made worse off under a Pareto improvement and at least
one person is made better off, it follows that no one would object to-or,
more strongly, that everyone would consent to-Pareto improvements. But
this is either false or a logical consequence of the definition of the notion of
preference. In neither case can the fact that parties would prefer this or that
be a reason or ground for their consent. The argument after all is simply
this: People prefer S to A; therefore, people would consent to S (over A).
The first clause is supposed to represent the idea of Pareto superiority, the
second that of consent. The second is thus the grounds of the first. In fact,
people sometimes choose to do what they do not prefer to do, and do not do
what they would otherwise prefer to do, often because they think it wrong
to act as they would otherwise prefer. So we cannot infer choice from
preference. We could of course infer choice (or consent) from preference,
but only if we build the notion of choice into the definition of what it is to
have a preference. Often that is in fact what we do. To say that S prefers A
is just to say that S has a disposition to choose A when the option is
available. But when we do that, we cannot employ the notion of choice as
an independent moral basis for the Pareto ranking. Quite the contrary in
fact. We are merely defining the Pareto rankings in terms of hypothetical
choices. In other words, the consent argument for Pareto superiority either
fails or is best understood as a definition of rational self-interest.
To sum up: (1) Kaldor-Hicks, and not the Pareto criteria, is the basic
standard of efficiency in law and economics. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is
intransitive. Two states of affairs can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient to one
another. Utility observes transitivity, but Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not.
This suggests that Kaldor-Hicks does not embody or express the utilitarian
ideal. (2) States of affairs that satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks standard may
produce losers as well as winners. The losers cannot be expected to consent
to their losses, or at least we cannot infer that they will. Therefore, there is
no Kantian or consent defense for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. (3) Nor is there
a consent-based defense of Pareto optimality in the offing. On the
assumption that losers will not consent to their losses, all we can say is that
once at a Pareto optimal point, individuals will not unanimously consent to
departures from it. (4) Nor can one infer that Pareto superior states are
consented to. One can infer that Pareto superior states are preferred to those
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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states Pareto inferior to them. But the fact that they are preferred does not
entail that they are consented to, unless preference is defined in terms of
consent. In that case, the claim that Pareto superior states are consented to
expresses a definition, and thus consent cannot ground or justify Pareto
superiority, being completely constitutive of it. Or so I have argued.
II. FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE:
ASSESSING THE KAPLOW-SHAVELL ARGUMENT
This is the backdrop against which we approach our discussion of the
Kaplow-Shavell book-a book that explicitly limits itself to addressing
only these and other issues in normative law and economics. This is not a
book that extols the explanatory virtues of efficiency or the importance of
modeling legal problems as ones about the efficient allocation of
resources. 2 1 It is a book whose central claim is that considerations of
welfare are the only defensible grounds on which to assess legal policy and
proposals calling for legal reform.2 2 This is a claim that presupposes the
value of efficiency, that invites us to reconsider the very same questions
that Posner and his critics took up twenty years ago. At the end of the day,
after all, the book's claim is interesting only if both fairness and welfare are
at least prima facie plausible candidates for assessing legal practice. Were
fairness not even a plausible candidate for assessing legal practice, the
claim that welfare is more appropriate to the evaluation of the law than is
fairness would be both unimportant and uninteresting. Were welfare an
implausible candidate for assessing legal practice, the claim that it is more
appropriate than fairness in evaluating law would be no more than a bad
joke.
This means that several burdens fall to Kaplow and Shavell. In the first
place, because the aim of the book is to compare welfare and fairness with
regard to their value as standards for evaluating the law, they owe us
accounts of welfare and fairness.
23
21. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 4 n.3.
22. See id. at 3 ("Our central claim is that the welfare-based normative approach should be
exclusively employed in evaluating legal rules."); see also id. at 5 ("[T]he design of the legal
system should depend solely on concerns for human welfare.").
23. In a book of this length, a reviewer is likely to find much with which to take issue.
Indeed, I found no shortage of such disagreements, but I want to limit my discussion to this, the
central argument of the book. I cannot resist, however, pointing out that the authors often show
themselves incapable of taking on the issues they tackle on the philosophical grounds they have
chosen. One place where their lack of philosophical understanding is especially noteworthy is
right at the core of the book-otherwise I would be inclined just to let the issue pass.
One of their persistent criticisms of deontologists is that we do not seem capable of settling
on a shared definition of various of the notions of fairness at play. See, e.g., id. at 45-47, 86-99.
We do not, for example, agree about what corrective justice is or about the nature of retributivism
or distributive justice. This criticism is doubly mistaken. Most importantly, philosophers of law
are not in the business of defining "fairness" or cognate terms like "corrective justice" and
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We need to know what it is we are comparing. It would be demanding
too much to require that Kaplow and Shavell defend one or another
conception of fairness and welfare as uniquely correct or better than a range
of plausible alternatives. Whereas Kaplow and Shavell need not defend
accounts of welfare and fairness as correct, they do need to offer accounts
of each that answer to several adequacy conditions. One crucial adequacy
condition is the requirement that any account offered must have the
resources sufficient to explain why welfare and fairness are valuable. More
than that, really. The accounts offered must have resources adequate to
explain why both are apt for the assessment of law. Not every value, after
all, is one suitably pursued through the coercive machinery of the law. An
account of welfare that left it mysterious why a rational policymaker might
think that legal policies ought to be assessed according to their impact on
welfare would fail as an account of welfare. Similarly, an account of the
nature of fairness that left it mysterious why a rational policymaker might
argue that the law ought to conform to the demands of fairness would fail as
an account of fairness. Even if it is too strong an adequacy condition to
impose on an account of either welfare or fairness that it be capable of
explaining the aptness of either for assessing law, the condition is
minimally necessary to make the Kaplow-Shavell book interesting. After
all, their explicit aim is to show that welfare is a more appropriate criterion
for assessing legal policy than is fairness, and that project is interesting only
insofar as fairness and welfare are both plausible criteria for assessing legal
policy in the first place.
Beyond that, Kaplow and Shavell must provide a standard for deciding
between the two. They need to defend that standard as appropriate and
argue that applying it to the relevant facts leads to the conclusion that
welfare is uniquely apt to the assessment of legal policy. Focusing on the
standard itself for a moment, it is important to note that it might take a
broader or a narrower scope. Someone might defend the unique
appropriateness of welfare (or fairness) as a tool for assessing legal practice
by showing first that welfare (or fairness) is the correct standard for
assessing all human action. Or one might argue that welfare (or fairness) is
uniquely appropriate to assessing the law while setting to one side concerns
"retributivism." We are not providing a semantic or meta-semantic account of terms, but a
theoretical account of the nature of the thing to which the term arguably refers. We disagree with
one another about what fairness is, what corrective and distributive justice are, and, indeed, what
welfare is. Ours is not a disagreement in the first instance as to the semantic content of "fairness"
or "corrective justice," for example. In claiming that fairness is appropriate to the assessment of
law, we cannot be understood as making the claim that the content of "fairness" is appropriate to
assessing law. Our disagreements are theoretical, not semantic or meta-semantic (although as
philosophers of language, we may-and do-have such disagreements as well). And once we
realize that our disagreements are theoretical, not semantic, it is hardly surprising that we
disagree. After all, the content of political principles-and the demands they impose-are nothing
if not controversial.
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about which norms are appropriate to the assessment of human or political
actions more broadly.
Most, but not necessarily all, deontologists adopt the view that the
standards appropriate to assessing political or legal action need not apply to
human conduct more generally. This means that the aptness, say, of
corrective or retributive justice for assessing tort and criminal law
respectively is not in general thought to depend on whether compensatory
or punitive practices within the family are similarly regulated by principles
of corrective and retributive justice. In contrast, utilitarians incline to the
view that the principle -of utility is appropriate for the assessment of legal or
political action just because all action is appropriately assessed by its
impact on utility. The principle plays out differently in different contexts,
but it remains the appropriate ultimate standard of assessment in all.
Because of this difference in scope of application, the standard for
assessing the appropriateness of fairness and welfare as normative
frameworks for the law has to be tailored to law. A welfarist or utilitarian is
free to believe and contend that welfare or utility is uniquely suitable to
assessing human conduct broadly, but she cannot count it against her
deontologist rivals that retributive or corrective justice is not.24 She cannot,
that is, unless she is also prepared to offer an additional argument to the
effect that a norm is appropriate to assessing legal practice only if it is
appropriate to assessing human conduct more generally--only, in other
words, if she is prepared to argue that the political must be derivable from
the ethical. Kaplow and Shavell offer no such argument, nor do I have
reason to think that they would be inclined to do so. Thus, they must take
on the deontologist on the narrower ground that welfare is superior to
fairness as a criterion for assessing legal practice, setting to one side the
relative merits of both in assessing human conduct more generally.
To sum up to this point: To support the claim the book makes, Kaplow
and Shavell must first provide accounts of welfare and fairness that explain
why both are apt for the assessment of legal policy. Then they need both to
identify a standard for choosing between the two and to defend its
appropriateness. Finally, they need to argue-on the basis of relevant facts
about law, fairness, and welfare, together with the relevant evaluative
standard-that welfare is uniquely appropriate to the assessment of law.
This is the kind of argument the central claim of the book demands. The
most striking feature of the book is that there are no such arguments in it.
There are no explicit substantive accounts of either welfare or fairness
24. It is worth noting, as Rawls has, that the classical utilitarians were concerned primarily
with questions of institutional design and not with human conduct more broadly or with specific
details of legal practice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22 (1971). Concern for the role
the principle of utility plays in answering every minute detail of legal practice is very much a
modem phenomenon, and not a particularly attractive one either.
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offered, no argument presented that explains why either is valuable or apt
for assessing the law. Nor is a standard for choosing between the two
articulated, let alone defended as correct, and so there is no argument from
such a standard to the book's central conclusion. What then is there?
There is instead the following-what I will refer to as the "main
argument":
(1) A person's welfare is a function of what he or she values. 25
(2) To say that a person values something is to say that it can be
represented as an argument in his utility function, or that it is
the logical object of one of his preferences.26
(3) Fairness is thought to be valuable.27
(4) To say that fairness is valuable is ambiguous between the claim
that (a) fairness is something that persons (some or all) prefer,
and the claim that (b) fairness is valuable apart from whether or
not persons prefer it.28
(5) If fairness is valuable insofar as it is the object of a preference,
, o 29
then fairness is a constituent of a person's welfare.
(6) If fairness is a constituent of welfare, then pursuing fairness
improves welfare or is in any event compatible with welfare.3 °
(7) If, however, the value of fairness is independent of its being
preferred or valued by someone, then pursuing fairness is
incompatible with welfare maximization.31
(8) Therefore, whether pursuing fairness is compatible with
welfare depends on whether it is an independent value. Fairness
as an independent value is incompatible with welfare because it
diminishes welfare.
32
25. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 18. The reader should note that what I refer to as
the "main argument" synthesizes claims that the authors make at various points in the first part of
the book; Kaplow and Shavell themselves do not lay out their contentions in so systematic a form.
26. See id. at 18 n.6.
27. See, e.g., id. at 10 (recognizing that "notions of fairness are,.. widely employed and
respected").
28. See id. at 11-12, 21-23.
29. See id. at 21 (noting that individuals can have a taste for fairness, just as they can have a
taste for fine wine).
30. See id. ("[When an individual has a taste for fairness], satisfying the principle of fairness
enhances the individual's well-being .
31. See id. at 52, 58.
32. See id.
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(9) Therefore, understood as an independent value-that is,
something whose value is independent of whether it is the
object of anyone's desire or preference-fairness is
inappropriate as a standard of assessment.33
(10) Because fairness so conceived is an inappropriate standard for
assessing conduct of any sort, it is inappropriate to assessing
the law.
This has the form of an argument, but it may be a mere tautology.
Insofar as fairness is valuable as the object of desire, pursuing it is
compatible with welfare. To the extent it is valuable apart from anyone's
preference for it, pursuing it is counter to preference satisfaction, and to the
extent that preference satisfaction is constitutive of welfare, it is
incompatible with welfare. This is no more than a tautology, and,
remarkably, Kaplow and Shavell admit as much. 34 Nor is it an informative
tautology. It is not, in other words, a truth whose existence or import is
revealed only upon seeing the connections brought to light by the argument.
It simply follows from the view of welfare as constituted by the objects of
one's preferences and of fairness as the remainder, that is, as logically
independent of one's preferences, that if we pursue the latter we do so at the
expense of the former. No elaborate argument is needed to support that
claim or to have its insights revealed to us.
Because the argument does no more than reveal the analytic
relationship between conceptions of fairness and welfare, whatever claims
it makes about how fairness decreases welfare can be recast as claims about
how welfare diminishes fairness. 3' Thus, any conclusion about the relative
appropriateness of welfare as against fairness for assessing the law can be
recast as a conclusion about how fairness is more appropriate than welfare.
In fact, neither conclusion would be warranted by the argument. The
argument merely elaborates a tautology, and no normative conclusion
follows from a tautology. One could conclude from this argument that
welfare is preferable to fairness as a standard for assessing law only if one
could also conclude that fairness is preferable to welfare-such is the
nature of the tautology. Either conclusion is simply a non sequitur; a
fortiori, so is the conclusion Kaplow and Shavell draw. So much for the
main argument.
33. See id. at 56.
34. Id. at 7, 58.
35. Perhaps the point is better put by claiming that welfare precludes pursuing certain
demands of fairness, rather than by claiming that welfare diminishes or decreases fairness. The
latter way of casting the claim suggests that fairness, like welfare, is something that can be added
up and maximized. It need not be, and probably is not.
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Unfortunately, this is the only relatively explicit argument Kaplow and
Shavell offer. There are, however, a variety of considerations that appear to
play a significant role in their overall assessment of the case for welfare as
against fairness, and if we identify and attend to them we may be able to
construct another argument on behalf of their central claim. Kaplow and
Shavell strongly believe that moral, political, and legal philosophers drawn
to deontic considerations grossly underestimate and otherwise fail fully to
appreciate the extent to which pursuing fairness can diminish welfare.3 6 So
even if it is analytic that fairness decreases welfare, it is important to note
just how much it does, or, more accurately, how much in principle it could.
No one would endorse the pursuit of fairness were there reason to think that
doing so could make everyone worse off. Yet that is precisely the sort of
disaster pursuing fairness could occasion, or so they argue.
3 7
Kaplow and Shavell draw two implications from the strongly adverse
effects of fairness on welfare. The first is that those who support deontic
standards for assessing law incur an argumentative burden. Given that (1)
welfare is appropriate to assessing legal practices and that (2) fairness can
impose tremendous costs on welfare, the burden is to explain why the law
ought nevertheless to conform to the demands of fairness. That is a burden
that falls on the deontologist, and there is no comparable burden on the
welfarist. Assuming next that (1) and (2) above are true, it is then puzzling
that actual policymakers and ordinary folk, as well as political philosophers,
urge that legal policy should conform to the demands of fairness. In other
words, in spite of the easily demonstrated adverse effects of fairness on
welfare, there remain deeply rooted deontic intuitions, whose existence
calls out for explanation. It is central to Kaplow and Shavell's thinking that
they believe that they have identified just such an explanation. It is, broadly
speaking, an evolutionary argument. 38 Possessing strong deontic beliefs is
evolutionarily selected for. Such beliefs contribute to human survival and
thus to human welfare. Evidence, moreover, of this fact is the extent to
which such intuitions are reflected in the informal norms that guide
relations among us.
If we put these considerations together, we can construct what I will
refer to as the "subsidiary argument":
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(1) It is indeed a tautology that pursuing fairness diminishes
welfare. 39 This is no more interesting than is the equally true
claim that pursuing welfare diminishes fairness.
(2) Though (1) is a tautology, the important point is that
deontologists underestimate the extent to which pursuing
fairness can in fact diminish welfare. In the extreme case,
pursuing fairness can make everyone worse off as judged by
each person's conception of her welfare.
40
(3) This means that fairness can be very detrimental indeed to
welfare.4'
(4) Still, in spite of the detrimental impact of fairness on welfare,
many people believe that we ought to assess policies in terms
of their fairness, and not in terms of their impact on welfare.42
(5) Given what we know about the value of welfare and the
detrimental impact of fairness on it, the existence and
persistence of such a belief is puzzling. This puzzle begs for an
explanation. The explanation can be located in the mechanisms
of evolutionary biology. Having strong deontic intuitions
reflected in practices has evolutionary value. It contributes to
survival and to human welfare accordingly.43
(6) Thus, we can offer a reasoned explanation for the value of
welfare and a causal explanation for the belief in the value of
fairness. Reasoned explanations rationalize and, in doing so,
justify or explain the value of welfare. In contrast, causal
explanations deflate the justificatory claims made on behalf of
fairness .44
(7) Therefore, because welfare is rationalizable as a standard, it is
appropriate to evaluating the law. In contrast, it is the belief in
the value of fairness that is explained-not by reasons, but by
39. Id. at 7,58.
40. Id. at 58.
41. Id. Elaborating upon this claim is, of course, the main purpose of the book's large second
part.
42. Id. at 62.
43. See id. at 62-70.
44. See id. at 62-63, 69-72, 77. For instance, Kaplow and Shavell argue as follows:
[The] source of the appeal of notions of fairness-that they are associated with social
norms to which we have an attachment-does not carry any implication that they
should receive weight as evaluative principles when choosing legal rules. Quite the
contrary is the case .... If we were self-conscious about the role of social norms and
the origins of our instincts and intuitions about them, we would not be led to attach
independent weight to notions of fairness for the purpose of assessing legal policy.
Id. at 71-72.
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causes. So we must assess the law by considerations of welfare,
even as we recognize the forces of nature that pull us to
fairness: a pull our rational selves must resist if we are to do
what is right.
45
The main argument is an elaborated tautology offered in support of a
non sequitur. The subsidiary argument is not a tautology, but it is no less
problematic and unpersuasive. Let's begin with the thought that
philosophers drawn to assessing legal practices and policies along broadly
speaking deontic lines (fairness or justice) underestimate the extent to
which pursuing the latter can diminish welfare. Presumably this is an
empirical claim about deontologists, and, if so, it is false. Each of the
traditional and widely known objections to utilitarianism put forth by
deontologists presupposes that pursuing fairness or justice comes at a very
high price to utility (or welfare). All the old war-horse examples-
including the case of punishing the innocent-are constructed around the
conflict between fairness and welfare (broadly construed). In the usual case,
considerations of security and welfare make an overwhelming argument for
punishing an innocent man. The question is whether we ought to. The
deontologist argues we cannot. There is simply no way of understanding the
deontologist's argument other than by attributing to him an implicit
acknowledgment of the high cost to welfare of acting in conformity with
the demands of justice. Indeed, there is no way of understanding any of the
standard deontological objections to utilitarianism of this form other than as
acknowledgments of the claim that conformity to justice demands much in
the way of costs to welfare. So much is taken for granted. It is a further
question whether the deontological arguments are always convincing-that,
in other words, the costs to welfare are worth the price of justice. And it is a
further question still whether deontologists must be committed to the view
that no price to welfare is too high when incurring it is necessary to
conform to the demands of justice. But there is simply no question that
deontologists are more than adequately aware of the extent to which
45. See id. at 69-72, 77, 80-81. Kaplow and Shavell perhaps put the point most starkly in the
following passage:
[L]egal policy analysts-being members of society and thus under the influence of
internalized social norms-naturally find appealing those legal rules and institutions
that seem fair, without appreciating the extent to which those feelings may be
independent of whether particular legal regimes actually enhance the well-being of
members of society. It is this tendency that we argue should be resisted.... After all,
the very purpose of academic discourse-and a central obligation of those designing
and reforming the legal system-is to go beyond the relatively reflexive responses of
ordinary individuals, so that we can identify when our instincts and intuitions about
what is the best policy lead us astray.
Id. at 80-81.
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conforming to the demands of justice can come at a very high cost indeed to
welfare.
Kaplow and Shavell similarly fail to appreciate that if what they offer
up is a good argument, it is as telling against the welfarist as it is against the
deontologist. For if conforming to justice can greatly diminish welfare, it is
equally true that pursuing welfare can greatly diminish justice. The very
same counterexamples to utilitarianism that presuppose the extent to which
one must forgo welfare to conform to the demands of fairness can be read
as indicating the extent to which pursuing welfare imposes costs on
fairness. Isn't that just the point of the punishing-the-innocent kind of
example? That is, if all we have in mind is pursuing welfare, then we run
the risk of imposing the greatest sorts of injustices-including punishing
those we know to be innocent of wrongdoing. Similar remarks are in order
for all such counterexamples to utilitarianism. In just the same way that
they require the deontologist to confront the cost to welfare of conformity
with justice, they force the welfarist to confront the cost to fairness of a
single-minded pursuit of welfare. That is why so much ink has been spilt on
these examples. They vividly raise the conflicts between two different
conceptions of right action, and the costs of a single-minded devotion to
either. Not only is it simply false that deontologists fail to appreciate the
costs to welfare of commitment to conformity with fairness, but also, if
true, the charge applies equally to the economist. We have uncovered no
truth about deontology or about its relationship to welfare. All Kaplow and
Shavell have provided are vivid examples of how the conflict between
welfare and fairness-a conflict that is inevitable, given the way they
conceptualize the two-might play out in actual practice.
The most puzzling feature of the Kaplow and Shavell argument is the
apparent sense that there is something perplexing about strong deontic
intuitions that calls for a causal explanation. 46 Every component of this part
of their argument is problematic-from the claim that deontic intuitions,
but not welfarist ones, need explanation, to the explanation itself, to the
implication that to offer a causal explanation of such intuitions is somehow
to deflate their justificatory force. Beyond that, again there is the problem
that they fail to see that if the arguments they marshal forward are adequate
against the deontologist, they are equally compelling against the welfarist.
Let's take up these problems in turn, beginning with the suggestion that
46. For example, Kaplow and Shavell note:
Our two conclusions, about how the pursuit of notions of fairness makes individuals
worse off and about the lack of affirmative warrant for using notions of fairness as
evaluative principles, raise the question of why legal policy analysts (including
ourselves), policymakers, and philosophers, among others, find these notions so
appealing.
Id. at 62.
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there is reason to think that strong deontic intuitions somehow call for
explanation.
Given the value of welfare and the detrimental impact of pursuing
fairness on it, Kaplow and Shavell wonder why it is that otherwise
intelligent people would insist that the law should conform to the demands
of fairness. The view that the law should cannot be defended by reason. The
best one can hope to do is to explain why philosophers and others
nevertheless insist on it. Where Kaplow and Shavell fail to see the
possibility of justification, they offer an explanation instead. The belief in
the value of fairness cannot be justified, but it can be explained. Indeed, the
fact that it can be explained is part of what counts against the claim itself.
This is a difficult idea, and some care must be taken to understand it and its
significance within their overall argument.
To this end, it is helpful to distinguish between two (of many possible)
views about the relationship between explanatory and normative projects.
The first of these is represented by a particular form of philosophical
naturalism, what we may call "replacement naturalism. '47 Replacement
naturalism is the view that normative projects-whether in epistemology,
jurisprudence, or the philosophy of mind-are hopeless. Because normative
projects cannot succeed, the only projects left worth pursuing are
explanatory ones.
A familiar example from epistemology illustrates the general strategy
of argument. We can think of the central projects in epistemology in the
following way. Begin by thinking of sensory experience as epistemic inputs
and beliefs, theories, or worldviews as epistemic outputs. The project of
epistemology is to determine which outputs are warranted by a given set of
inputs. This is the project of identifying the criteria of warranted or justified
belief. Beliefs are warranted if they are appropriately supported by the
inputs. What constitutes appropriate support or justification? In this sense,
traditional epistemology is "justification-centered." Famously, Quine
argued that there are no a priori discoverable rules that uniquely pick out
some beliefs as warranted and others as not, given a set of epistemic inputs.
Philosophy has nothing to contribute to helping us identify the norms of
sound or good reasoning-the norms that, if followed, would uniquely
warrant some beliefs and not others.48 Instead of trying to determine the
norms governing good reasoning-those which, if followed, would warrant
beliefs-we should study how people in fact reason. Traditional
47. See Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 79 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) (distinguishing among types of naturalism);
see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 210-17 (2001) (assessing the prospects
of a naturalized jurisprudence).
48. See W.V. QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 69 (1969) (arguing from confirmation holism and the underdetermination thesis against a
priori, justification-centered epistemology).
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epistemology would be reduced to a chapter buried somewhere in a
psychology textbook as its justificatory projects gave way to explanatory
projects of cognitive psychology; thus the phrase "replacement naturalism."
From the view that explanatory inquiries substitute for normative ones,
we can distinguish a family of views around the claim that causal
explanations have normative consequences. There are of course many
senses in which explanations are normative, and many ways in which
explanations can play a role in normative arguments, none of which need be
controversial. Not all the views one might have about the relationship of
explanation to justification are so innocent, and in a moment I want to focus
on one particularly controversial claim. According to the claim on which I
want to focus, a causal explanation of why someone asserts the claim she
does bears on our assessment of the merits of the claim itself. In particular,
in the form of the claim upon which Kaplow and Shavell rely, causal
explanations of the beliefs we have and the claims we make can deflate
those beliefs and claims.
Before focusing on this claim and its centrality to their argument, it is
important to contrast it a bit further with some more familiar law-and-
economics attitudes regarding the place of explanatory and normative
projects. Some advocates of law and economics are skeptical of the value of
normative projects and are inclined instead to restrict themselves to
explanatory endeavors. This makes them naturalists of a sort, self-aware or
not. Others are not skeptical of normative judgments as such, but feel that
the special role of economic analysis is not to advance normative judgments
but to contribute to the rationality of the judgments we reach by uncovering
important causal connections, for example between liability rules and
accident rates. Most law and economics contributes to the wisdom of our
judgments and the defensibility of our social policies in precisely this way.
Kaplow and Shavell eschew these more modest understandings of the
way in which causal explanations can figure in normative arguments in
favor of the much stronger claim that a causal explanation of the beliefs
individuals have deflates the merits of the beliefs themselves.49 As they see
it, the fact that there is a persuasive causal explanation of why many
people-including philosophers, policymakers, and ordinary folk-believe
that the law ought to promote fairness should figure in our assessment of
the claim itself. Why else would they introduce, in the course of defending
welfare against fairness, the fact that such an explanation exists?
There are two connected claims here: first, that there is a persuasive
causal explanation of why individuals insist on the view that the law ought
49. I do not mean to suggest that Kaplow and Shavell, jointly or severally, do not pursue
these more modest projects elsewhere, including elsewhere in this book. Rather, the point is that
the central argument they make against fairness depends on this stronger thesis.
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to be assessed by its conformity to the demands of fairness, and, second,
that the fact that there is such an explanation counts in our assessment of
the underlying merits of the claims of fairness. This latter claim is the
interesting one for our purposes. There is no denying that it is bold and
distinctive and, as we shall see in a moment, essential to their overall
argument. Bold, distinctive, and essential to the argument it may be, but
plausible and adequately defended it is not. Worse, were the claim sound, it
would likely undermine rather than support their overall thesis.
Without qualification, the view that the existence of a causal
explanation of the fact that someone holds or asserts a particular claim
undermines the truth of the claim asserted simply cannot be sustained.
Often, the best causal explanation of why someone might assert that P is the
truth of P. So it cannot be that causal explanations as such undermine the
truth of the claim the assertion of which is being explained. The thesis must
be narrowed or weakened. Even if most causal explanations have no
bearing on the truth of the claims asserted, some explanations might. Which
causal explanations of the beliefs we have go to our assessment of the
merits of our beliefs, and why? Kaplow and Shavell obviously believe that
evolutionary explanations of our beliefs have a bearing on the merits of the
beliefs themselves. For they argue both that there is an evolutionary
explanation for the fact that individuals believe in the value of fairness as
appropriate to assessing the law, and that this fact cuts against the claim of
fairness and indirectly supports the claim of welfare.
As they see it, evolution shows that it is to our collective advantage to
believe that our affairs should be regulated by fairness, and so it should
come as no surprise that individuals insist that our affairs be regulated by
fairness. On their view, we insist on fairness because it is to our advantage
to do so, not because our affairs really ought to be regulated by fairness.
Once we are suitably attuned to the evolutionary advantages of our strong
deontic intuitions-advantages evidenced, they claim, by the extent to
which our informal norms and practices embody fairness5° -the grip of
those principles on us is correspondingly weakened. Learning the source
weakens the grip, and in this way evolutionary explanations figure in our
justifiably discounting the content of the claims of fairness.
It is easy to confuse this view with a familiar and more plausible one
that is common in everyday discourse. In a heated debate on tort reform,
one participant advances the view that a cap should be imposed on damage
awards for medical malpractice, and another replies by noting that the
advocate of capped damage awards is a surgeon who has been sued
successfully for medical malpractice. In so replying, she means to deflate
the surgeon's claim. Another person advances the view that rents in New
50. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 63-69.
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York City should remain stabilized, and others dismiss her view on the
grounds that she lives in a rent-stabilized apartment. In these cases,
reflecting on the source of the claims, we are not surprised by the opinions
both advocate, and we are properly skeptical of their motives. Even so,
while we may be skeptical of the motives in each case and wary of the
arguments adduced, the fact remains that both the surgeon and the
apartment dweller may be right. They are interested advocates, and this
may increase their burden to make a compelling case, but such a case can
be made. And for the obvious reason that the causal story goes to the
reliability (one way or another) of the witness, not to the truth of what is
asserted.
Kaplow and Shavell are making a stronger claim. For it is not their
view that once we learn the evolutionary origins of the belief in fairness
that we should adopt a skeptical posture to those who advocate fairness-a
posture that would incline us to demand more in the way of normative
argument before we are persuaded by the truth of the underlying claim.
Their view is that the evolutionary argument for fairness, by itself, is part of
the argument against it and for welfare.
I have attributed this claim to Kaplow and Shavell, but they nowhere
explicitly make the claim or defend it. My claim is not that Kaplow and
Shavell explicitly advance this view. Rather, my claim is that we must
attribute such a view to them to make their argument work. To appreciate
the centrality of this claim to their overall argument, we need to retrace the
argument up to the point at which the evolutionary argument for the belief
in fairness is introduced.
The basic argument rests on just a few ideas. As I have reconstructed it,
the basic thought is that welfare is valuable and that pursuing fairness is
detrimental to it. This cannot suffice to defeat fairness for the simple reason
that we can run the argument in reverse. Fairness is valuable, and pursuing
welfare is detrimental to it. The charge against fairness is then strengthened
with the observation that pursuing fairness can greatly diminish welfare.
This is no help either, since the same is true of fairness: Pursuing welfare
can greatly limit our ability to act in accordance with the demands of
fairness. This is basically the argument of the book, but for two ancillary
discussions-one on the evolutionary origins of the belief in fairness and
another on, loosely speaking, the plasticity of our deontic intuitions.
51
This means that in the absence of the evolutionary argument, Kaplow
and Shavell have adduced no considerations against fairness and for welfare
that could not be recast to cut the other way. Without the evolutionary
argument, nothing they say cuts one way or the other. The evolutionary
51. These latter considerations are introduced partly to bolster the evolutionary argument and
partly as an independent argument against fairness.
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argument thus carries a very heavy burden. It is all that stands between their
having made the case for welfare and their having made no case at all. The
evolutionary argument is supposed to introduce considerations that cut
against fairness and for welfare. And how can that be unless the existence
of an evolutionary explanation for fairness counts against the claims of
fairness and for welfare? There is no way to read the evolutionary argument
in the context of the book other than as an effort to deflate the claims of
fairness and thus indirectly to make the case for welfare.
With so much riding on the evolutionary argument, we should pause for
a moment to identify what Kaplow and Shavell would have to demonstrate
in order to make good on it. Evolutionary arguments are a species of causal
explanations. Causal explanations of why someone believes or asserts what
he does typically do not bear on the merits of those beliefs or assertions. So
one thing Kaplow and Shavell need to do is to explain why evolutionary
explanations do. More than that, of course; they would need to explain why
evolutionary arguments deflate rather than bolster the merits of the beliefs
whose existence they are said to explain. At the most basic level, of course,
they would need to show that evolution (or something like it) actually
selects for beliefs. In addition, they would have to show that evolution has
selected for the belief in fairness. Even this would not be enough, for they
would have to show that even though evolution selects for the belief in
fairness, it does not select for the belief in welfare. For if evolution selects
for the belief in welfare, the entire project would collapse.
Kaplow and Shavell meet none of these adequacy conditions. They
offer no basis on which to distinguish evolutionary arguments from other
causal or functional explanations-that is, no grounds for thinking that
evolutionary explanations go to the underlying merits of the beliefs we have
in a way in which other causal explanations do not. They offer no grounds
for thinking that evolutionary arguments deflate rather than bolster the
merits of our beliefs that have evolutionary origins. They provide no reason
for thinking that evolutionary factors select for beliefs. If evolution selects
for beliefs, they provide no reason for thinking it would select for the belief
in fairness and not for the belief in welfare.
We can set aside many of these worries for now because, even on its
own terms, the argument fails. It is something of an exaggeration to say that
Kaplow and Shavell offer an evolutionary explanation for the belief in
fairness, or for strong deontic intuitions more generally. They do little more
than gesture at an evolutionary-style argument.52 Roughly, the argument is
52. In doing so, they do not indicate that they understand the limits within which evolutionary
arguments are appropriate. Evolution does not select for particular beliefs held by particular
persons. If anything, it selects for human capacities, for example the capacity to have beliefs, or to
reason, etc. Too often, evolutionary arguments are really no more than metaphors for a "style" of
argument. This is not the place to explore the extent to which social scientists have misunderstood
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that there are evolutionary advantages to believing that human affairs ought
to be regulated by considerations of fairness. Once we understand the
evolutionary benefits of maintaining strong deontic intuitions, the puzzle is
solved. Those who insist on evaluating the law by its conformity with the
demands of fairness are advancing a view that cannot be sustained by
appeal to reason or to value, but which can be explained evolutionarily-as
a false but valuable one.
If Kaplow and Shavell are correct, the belief in the value of fairness (as
valuable independent of its connection to welfare) is mistaken. Not just a
harmless false belief either, but one that, to the extent that it has affected
our legal practices, has been the source of waste, misery, and misfortune.
The correct belief is in the value of welfare. The claim that evolution selects
for fairness implies that evolution would select for a false belief. Other
things being equal, we should want an accurate road map of the world as
we try to negotiate our way through it. After all, an- inaccurate road map
will likely lead us astray. If we think of our beliefs as constituting a map of
the world, why shouldn't we expect evolution to select for true beliefs,
rather than for false ones? Some of the beliefs on which we rely in making
our way through life are normative ones-beliefs about how we ought to
behave, what we owe one another, and how governments should regulate
affairs among us. Shouldn't we expect evolution to select for true normative
beliefs, not for false ones?
We don't have to claim that evolution must select for true beliefs in
order to undermine Kaplow and Shavell's argument. It is enough to note
that they provide no reason for thinking that evolution would select for this
particular false belief in the value of fairness as opposed to the true belief in
the value of welfare. If anything, there is at least as much reason for
thinking that evolution selects for welfare as for fairness. If evolution
selects for beliefs, it is likely to select for beliefs that contribute to our
capacity to negotiate the world successfully. In general, true rather than
false beliefs are more likely to contribute to our capacity to negotiate the
world. There is probably a better evolutionary argument for the economist's
insistence on welfare than there is for the philosopher's insistence on
fairness. Given their view that an evolutionary explanation of the beliefs
deflates the content of the beliefs, this would not be a good outcome for
them. On the one hand, evolutionary pressures explain the belief in welfare.
On the other hand, they are committed to the view that evolutionary
arguments deflate. The deflation claim seemed helpful when there was
and misapplied evolutionary arguments. For a recent conference on the use of evolutionary
arguments in the law, see Symposium, ASU-Gruter Conference on Law, Behavioral Biology, and
Economics, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 287 (2001).
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reason to think that evolutionary considerations would cut against fairness.
The argument looks less helpful when it is likely to cut against welfare.
These evolutionary considerations are even more troubling than we
have suggested so far. If true beliefs are the ones that are in fact
evolutionarily selected for and if the evolutionary argument cuts against
them, then the only claims that are not undercut by evolution are the ones
evolution does not select for: namely, false, unhelpful ones. Could anything
be more implausible than this? In fact, all this is best taken as a reductio of
the entire form of argument.
This line of objection seems so devastating to the evolutionary
argument that I wonder whether I have misunderstood the role that
evolutionary considerations are to play in their thinking. Perhaps the
evolutionary argument is offered to make a different point, namely that
everything, even the belief in fairness, survives only because it contributes
to welfare. That argument might run as follows. We have three categories
of beliefs on which we might act: the belief in the value of welfare; the
belief in the value of fairness, where fairness is reducible to an argument in
this or that person's utility function; and the belief in fairness, where
fairness is thought to be something valuable whether or not anyone has a
taste for it. 53 Acting on the belief in the value of welfare (other things being
equal) promotes welfare. Acting on the belief in the value of fairness as
something valuable insofar as individuals have a taste for it also promotes
welfare (other things being equal). There is an apparent tension when
philosophers and others argue that we should act on a belief in the value of
fairness as something valuable whether or not anyone has a taste for it.
Such action would appear to be inconsistent with welfare. But the
evolutionary argument shows us that this inconsistency is more apparent
than real. For the belief in fairness as an independent value itself survives
only because it is welfare enhancing. Evolution shows us that everything
converges on welfare, even fairness; everything that survives contributes to
welfare.
If this is the argument Kaplow and Shavell have in mind, then rather
than supporting the central thesis of the book, it overwhelms it. If
everything survives because it contributes to welfare, then that's all there is
to it. It does not matter how we assess the law. If we think it appropriate to
assess the law by its impact on welfare, that's good because doing so
contributes to welfare. If, on the other hand, we come to the view that we
ought to assess the law by the extent to which it conforms to the demands
of fairness, no problem. For we have come to that belief evolutionarily.
53. The difference between the two conceptions of fairness is this: In one sense, fairness is
valuable because someone values it (as judged by the fact that he or she has a taste for it). In the
other sense, fairness is valuable, and therefore individuals ought to value it-that is, they ought to
prefer it or have a taste for it. It is a reason on which they ought to act.
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And if we have come to that view evolutionarily, acting on such a view
contributes to welfare. The problem with interpreting the evolutionary
argument this way is that it makes a joke of the book's project; there is no
meaningful sense in which there is a competition between fairness and
welfare. The only competition is between direct and less direct methods of
attaining welfare. Indeed, promoting welfare is hardly something that we
attain, for at the end of the day, evolution makes it impossible for us to do
anything else. Hardly the stuff of a classic work.
Kaplow and Shavell's reliance on evolutionary theory is a
methodological nightmare. In the first place, the appeal to evolutionary
considerations cannot be taken literally since evolution does not select for
particular beliefs. They claim that because there are advantages to a belief
in fairness, there must be an evolutionary-type argument for it. But they
also believe that the belief in the value of fairness is false, and moreover
that such a belief has many disadvantages as well. This is hardly adequate
material to support an evolutionary hypothesis that would explain the
persistence of a false belief.54 There is better reason to suppose that there is
an evolutionary argument for the belief in the value of welfare-a belief
Kaplow and Shavell insist is both true and beneficial. They provide no
reason for thinking that evolutionary arguments go to the merits of the
beliefs we have when other causal-finctional explanations do not, and no
reason for thinking that such explanations deflate rather than inflate the
underlying claims. Worse, if evolutionary explanations do go to the
underlying merits, that would put Kaplow and Shavell in a bind. There is an
evolutionary argument for welfare, and, on their view, such an argument
should undermine the claims of welfare. If, however, the evolutionary
argument is introduced to show that everything reduces to welfare at the
end of the day, then it proves too much.
Forgetting the methodological confusions that ravage the argument
itself, and focusing only on what inferences we can draw from it, several
options are available. If there is an evolutionary argument for fairness, then
there is one for welfare. If evolutionary arguments deflate the normative
beliefs they explain, the claim to the value of welfare as well as claims to
the value of fairness are equally deflated. If evolutionary arguments are
irrelevant to the content of the claims the belief in which they explain, then
the evolutionary argument is a non sequitur. If the evolutionary argument
54. My claim is not that evolution selects for true beliefs. My view is that evolution does not
select for beliefs in general. If it did select for beliefs, I would not claim that it selects only for
true beliefs. There are of course persistent false beliefs, and it is an interesting question as to why
they survive as long as they do given powerful countervailing evidence. That is an issue for those
more versed in evolutionary epistemology than I. My point is the very modest one that other
things being equal there is a better armchair case-and that, after all, is all that Kaplow and
Shavell offer-to be made on behalf of the evolutionary advantages of the belief in welfare than
there is for the belief in fairness.
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shows that everything is reducible to welfare, then it makes a mockery of
the book. At the end of the day, the evolutionary argument is either a non
sequitur, proves nothing, or proves too much. In no case can it shoulder the
burdens Kaplow and Shavell have placed on it.
It might be helpful if we synthesize all the arguments of the first part of
the book.
(1) From the main argument we can derive the conclusion that
pursuing fairness reduces welfare.
(2) From the subsidiary argument, we get illustrations of the extent
to which it might.
(3) From the subsidiary argument, we also get a causal explanation
of the belief that pursuing fairness is appropriate.
(4) From the subsidiary argument, therefore, we derive a
deflationism about the normative claims for fairness.
(5) When all of these considerations are put together, we have an
argument for the conclusion that pursuing welfare (as against
the alternative of pursuing fairness) is uniquely appropriate to
the legal domain.
The problems with the argument can be put as follows:
(1) Given how they define the terms, the claim that fairness
diminishes welfare is a tautology and can be recast as the claim
that welfare diminishes fairness.
(2) The subsidiary argument illustrates not just that fairness can
greatly diminish welfare, but that welfare can in fact greatly
diminish fairness as well.
(3) To the extent that the subsidiary argument offers an adequate
causal explanation of strong deontic intuitions, the same
argument applies to strong welfarist intuitions.
(4) To the extent to which evolutionary or causal explanations
more generally deflate normative claims on behalf of deontic
beliefs, they deflate analogous claims made on behalf of
welfare.
(5) On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that causal
explanations deflate justificatory claims in either case.
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The problem with Fairness Versus Welfare is that it makes a normative
claim but offers no normative arguments to support it. Instead, Kaplow and
Shavell present a mixture of tautological claims about the relationship
between fairness and welfare, and putative causal explanations of the fact
that individuals have strong deontic intuitions. The former are empty and
cannot support a normative claim. In truth, the latter fail to rise above the
level of mere speculations. Even as adequate causal explanations, such
factors are irrelevant to the truth of the underlying claims on behalf of
fairness. And, as I have demonstrated over and over, if the evolutionary
argument is a problem for the deontologist, it is a problem for the welfarist
as well. At the end of the day, of course, the existence of a possible causal-
functional explanation of why we believe what we do has no bearing on the
truth of what we believe.
III. WELFARE AND FAIRNESS REDUX: OUTLINING AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
The central claim of the book is that the law should be assessed by its
impact on welfare and not by its conformity to the demands of fairness.
This claim is interesting only if both welfare and fairness are plausible
frameworks within which to evaluate the law. An argument appropriate to
sustaining the book's claim, therefore, would begin with substantive
accounts of both welfare and fairness. Such accounts would be adequate
insofar as each possessed resources sufficient to explain the value of
welfare (and fairness) as well as the aptness of each for evaluating the law.
Once adequate accounts of welfare and fairness were in place, an
appropriate argument would then set forth and defend a criterion for
choosing between welfare and fairness so conceived.
Kaplow and Shavell provide no criterion for choosing between fairness
and welfare-which is puzzling in a book entitled Fairness Versus Welfare.
They provide evidence that requiring the law to conform to the demands of
fairness limits the extent to which it can promote welfare. Many of these
very same examples, however, also illustrate the extent to which promoting
welfare restricts the extent to which the law might satisfy the demands of
fairness. And so the evidence they offer, while interesting in its own right,
has, in the absence of a criterion for choosing between welfare and fairness,
no bearing on the book's fundamental claim.
The reader should recall that it is Kaplow and Shavell, and not their
deontologist target, who make the radical claim. They claim that the law
should be assessed only by its impact on welfare, and never by its
conformity with the demands of fairness. The deontologist need make no
comparable claim. The deontologist need not, and likely does not, claim
that the law ought not to be assessed by its impact on welfare. He claims
only that in addition to being assessed by its impact on welfare, the law
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ought to be assessed as well by the extent to which it conforms to the
demands of justice. Kaplow and Shavell reject even that modest claim. One
would think, with the stakes so high and the claims so strong, that Kaplow
and Shavell would offer and defend a criterion for making the choice-but
they do not.
Nor, should it be said, do they offer an account of fairness or of its
value. Indeed, they explicitly reject the need to provide an account of what
fairness is. 55 Therefore, they offer no criterion for distinguishing corrective
from retributive justice, and both from distributive justice. All are lumped
together under the general rubric, fairness, whose value or aptness as a
standard for assessing the law remains completely obscure. On their view, it
is not necessary to explain what fairness is or why pursuing fairness is
valuable because their argument is that whatever fairness is and whatever is
valuable about it, pursuing it is detrimental to welfare.
If truth be told, the only serious claim they make is that fairness is
detrimental to welfare, and we have gone to great lengths to establish the
limited interest of this claim in making out the book's fundamental
conclusion. Even so, one would think that with so much riding on the claim,
Kaplow and Shavell would go to similar lengths to spell out the nature of
welfare and to explain its value and appropriateness to assessing the law. If
it is decisive against fairness that it is detrimental to welfare, then welfare
must be pretty damn important. It may be, but whether it is depends in part
on what we take welfare to be. So we need an account of what welfare is
and an explanation of its extraordinary value.
In fact, Kaplow and Shavell offer precious little by the way of an
account of the nature of welfare. They have even less to say about the value
of welfare-apparently content to observe that no one denies that welfare is
valuable.56 Although Kaplow and Shavell do not offer what anyone would
regard as an account of welfare, they do offer a general picture of its
constitutive elements. 57 There is enough in that picture for us to
differentiate it from other possible conceptions of human welfare, and to
ask whether welfare, so conceived, is something of such value that it could
provide the only standard suitable for assessing the law.
In what follows, I argue for two points. First, on any interpretation of
welfare plausibly attributed to Kaplow and Shavell, it is unclear what the
value of welfare is. It is even less clear why one would insist that welfare,
so conceived, is uniquely appropriate to assessing the law. If I am right, the
central claim of the book is entirely unsupported by their arguments.
Beyond that, I argue that any conception of welfare adequate to explain its
55. KAPLOW & SIIAVELL, supra note 1, at 5 n.7, 38-39 & n.48.
56. This is no place for casual empiricism. Similar casual empiricism would ground the value
of fairness, for there are few among us, I suspect, who would deny that fairness is valuable.
57. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 18-24, 409-36.
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value would also explain the moral significance of deontic considerations
and their aptness for assessing the law. Whatever it is about human welfare
that makes it appropriate to assessing the law explains why assessing the
law in terms of its justice and fairness is similarly appropriate. Any
argument offered in defense of their central claim merely defeats it. Thus, I
suggest that not only is the central claim of the book unsupported, it is
unsupportable.
Let's begin with their partial conception of welfare. In their framework,
the constitutive elements of a person's welfare are her preferences. 58 A
person can have welfare only insofar as she has preferences that obey a set
of rationality constraints. If a person has a set of preferences over all
possible social states, and these preferences obey familiar rationality
constraints, then a person can have welfare; and her welfare is determined
by the satisfaction of her preferences. The more her preferences are
satisfied, the greater her welfare. Maximizing preference satisfaction
maximizes welfare (for an agent).
The basic elements of welfare are preferences and their satisfaction.
This leads to the natural identification of welfare with preference
satisfaction. This identification is too quick, however, for the notion of
preference satisfaction is ambiguous between a logical and a psychological
sense. In the logical sense, to satisfy a preference is to realize it. To satisfy
Jones's preference that P is to bring P about. Whether a person's
preferences are satisfied in the logical sense is one thing; whether he is
satisfied in the sense of experiencing pleasure, joy, happiness, or
gratification as a result is another thing altogether.
59
We might flesh out Kaplow and Shavell's account of welfare in two
distinct ways corresponding to these two notions of satisfaction. In the
logical sense, a person's welfare is maximally satisfied when his desires are
maximally realized. If this is what welfare is, why is welfare in this sense
something of value? The value of welfare in this sense cannot be the value
we associate with gratification, joy, or pleasure. Rather, the value of
welfare is the value of seeing to it that people get what they want. And their
getting what they want-having their desires or preferences realized-is
valuable independent of what individuals want and whether getting what
they want is met with pleasure, joy, or gratification, on the one hand, or
consternation and regret on the other. Often we regret what we have chosen
to do and what we have done, what we desire to do and the actions that
58. Id.
59. A person can have his preferences satisfied-that is, realized-after he is dead. His
preference is therefore satisfied in the logical sense, but he secures no satisfaction in the
psychological sense. The dead may be raised but that does not mean they can get a rise out of
having their preferences satisfied in the logical sense. That, after all, is one of the unhappy
consequences of being dead.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1540 [Vol. 1 12: 151 1
HeinOnline  -- 112 Yale L.J.  1540 2002-2003
The Grounds of Welfare
flow from those desires. What is so valuable about seeing to it that
individuals get what they want-if what they prefer brings them no
happiness or joy, or if what they want is bad for them and for others-that
the law should promote welfare in this sense?
In contrast, if welfare is understood in terms of psychological
satisfaction, then it is not obvious what the value is of satisfying
preferences in the logical sense. After all, the psychological state that we
desire to bring about by acting on the basis of our preferences may
sometimes be achieved only by frustrating rather than by realizing our
desires. By the same token, because individuals may secure gratification or
satisfaction from all sorts of activities that are bad for them and for others
as well, why would anyone think that maximizing satisfaction in the
psychological sense should be the goal of law?
Although Kaplow and Shavell offer no general account of welfare, they
do understand welfare in terms of preference satisfaction. But preference
satisfaction is an ambiguous notion. There is an important difference
between satisfaction in the logical and the psychological sense, and the
relationship between the two notions is anything but unproblematic.
Satisfying preferences in the logical sense is no guarantor of satisfying
them in the psychological sense. On the other hand, satisfaction in the
psychological sense can require frustrating rather than satisfying
preferences in the logical sense. On neither account is the value of welfare
obvious. And its unique or distinctive appropriateness for assessing the law
remains mysterious.
I don't mean to suggest that gratification or psychological satisfaction
is undesirable or valueless. Nor am I suggesting that realizing one's desires
is similarly without appeal or value. Still, whatever the value of either may
be, it cannot carry the normative burden with which Kaplow and Shavell
saddle it. For their view is that welfare conceived in either sense is uniquely
appropriate to legal policy in a way in which fairness is not.60
60. I have heard proponents of law and economics argue more than once and always with a
straight face for a version of preference utilitarianism or preference welfarism based on a general
normative skepticism. On such views, there are no objective values; nothing is good or bad
objectively. All we have are people's preferences or desires. The problem here is the obvious one
that one cannot have it both ways. One cannot defend the normative value of satisfying
preferences while at the same time rejecting the objectivity of value. What is the value, one might
ask, of satisfying preferences when nothing has objective value? One cannot defend normative
claims on a foundation of normative skepticism. Sometimes this claim is weakened and recast as
the view that individual preferences are normatively less controversial than are the claims of
justice, of what we owe one another. But this is anything but obvious. I would argue that quite the
opposite is true. What is not mysterious to us is that we have no right to disregard the interests and
rights of others. What is mysterious is why, in spite of this, we give such a special standing to our
own interests. There may be a psychological explanation for why we accord our own interests
pride of place, but what calls out for justification is the normative priority we accord our own
desires. That position is, if anything is, mysterious and, in any case, quite controversial morally
speaking.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
HeinOnline  -- 112 Yale L.J.  1541 2002-2003
The Yale Law Journal
This brings us to my second, and ultimately more important, point. Any
plausible account of welfare that explains its value and aptness for
assessing the law also explains the value of fairness and its aptness for
assessing the law. We do better in understanding the nature of welfare and
its value if we think of an individual's welfare not in terms of his
preferences, but in terns of what is in his interests-not in terms of what he
desires, but in terms of what is good for him. Among the distinguishing
features of persons is that in addition to having preferences, they are
planning agents. They can formulate projects and plans, invest in and
execute them. They can form views about what it is they want from life,
and guide their behavior by the plans they make, the agreements they reach,
and the norms that regulate their affairs with others. This is part of what it is
to live a life of one's own-what it is for a life to be something one does
rather than something that happens to one.
Persons have interests not only in what they desire and in realizing
those desires, but also in autonomy and security. They are interested not
only in having their desires realized and in securing gratification and
pleasure. They also have an interest in organizing a life in a way that makes
sense of the desires they have. They have an interest in contributing to the
way their life unfolds. The capacity to live a life, and not merely to have a
life happen to one, depends on being able to express one's autonomy and on
being protected against persons who are unprepared to mitigate their action
in the light of the interests of others. Of course, any plausible theory of
what is valuable to a person would include the ability to act on the basis of
one's preferences and desires. But that is because autonomous action is
valuable to persons understood as planning agents who bear a special
relationship of ownership and responsibility to how their life goes, and not
because people have a taste for autonomy.
In the context of this brief Review, I cannot develop this line of
argument in detail. I have said a bit more about it elsewhere, and views of
this sort are familiar in the literature more broadly. 61 The idea here is that
once we acknowledge that human welfare matters because of something
about what it is to be a person-that is, to be an agent capable of living a
life of one's own, where how one's life goes is in part a matter of what one
does and not just a function of what happens to one-it is obvious that the
very same kinds of considerations that explain the value of welfare explain
our strong deontic intuitions as well. Principles that restrict the extent to
which we can pursue our own interests without regard for the impact of our
61. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 47, at 59-63; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981), reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE
11 (2000); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283 (1981), reprinted in DWORKIN, supra, at 65.
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actions on the interests and rights of others express a commitment to this
ideal of the person. We can think of distributive justice in roughly the same
way. It is a precondition of one's life being something one does, rather than
something that happens to one, that one have resources at one's disposal
adequate to that end. One who is completely the victim of misfortune and
bad luck is robbed of the capacity to realize oneself or one's personality in
the world. Welfare matters because the self-respect and dignity of persons
matter. The conditions of self-respect and human dignity require us to
mitigate our actions in ways that take into account the interests of others,
and to regulate our conduct by norms that fairly and justly adjudicate
among those competing interests.
Once we realize that welfare is connected to a person's interests-what
is good for him, and not merely to what he desires or to his gratification or
joy--it should be clear that whatever it is in that account that explains the
value of welfare explains as well the importance of the law's regulating
human affairs according to various principles of justice and fairness. It is
something about people, and not something about realizing desires or
gratifying psychological states, that makes human welfare valuable. But
whatever it is about persons that ultimately warrants concern for human
welfare warrants the view that justice must regulate affairs between
persons. It is not that justice is a constituent of welfare or welfare a
constituent of justice. Rather, both are important and distinct reflections of
the dignity and importance of persons. Any theory of the law that would
direct us to evaluate our practices by considering only welfare or justice and
not the other could do so only by impoverishing the idea of the person. In
doing so, it would indict itself more than any critic, sympathetic or
otherwise, could.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
15432003]
HeinOnline  -- 112 Yale L.J.  1543 2002-2003
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
HeinOnline  -- 112 Yale L.J.  1544 2002-2003
